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THE DELEGATION LOTTERY
Adrian Vermeule*
Replying to Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated
Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006).

Professor Matthew Stephenson’s article on legislative allocation of
delegated power between agencies and courts is clear, rigorous, and
brief, and makes a tangible contribution. The paper models “the decision calculus faced by a rational, risk-averse legislator who must
choose between delegation to an agency and delegation to a court.”1
On the assumption that delegation to agencies tends to produce consistency across issues while delegation to courts tends to produce consistency over time, a risk-averse legislator interested in reducing variance
along either dimension will face a tradeoff between intertemporal risk
diversification and interissue risk diversification. From this basic
tradeoff, Stephenson derives comparative statics about the rational,
risk-averse legislator’s choice of delegates under various conditions.
Stephenson himself describes the article’s contribution as “incremental,”2 and this seems appropriate. In general, there are two (compatible) ways of evaluating positive models: by reference to the realism
of the model’s assumptions and by reference to the model’s ability to
generate testable predictions that yield results with real-world significance.3 I shall suggest that the limitations of Stephenson’s legislativedelegation model stem from excessively artificial assumptions and
from an inability to yield significant predictions — in either the political or statistical sense.
With respect to assumptions, the tradeoff between realism and
mathematical tractability means that necessary simplifications are part
and parcel of the enterprise; but a good model is one that carves the
subject at its joints, capturing the central dynamic of the motivating
examples. In the legislative-delegation model Stephenson offers, however, the crucial simplifications seem not only artificial, but arbitrary
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
* Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Thanks to Jack Goldsmith, Daryl Levinson, Matt Stephenson, and Cass Sunstein for helpful comments.
1 Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and
the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2006).
2 Id. at 1042.
3 Compare Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in THE PHILOSOPHY
OF ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 180 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 2d ed. 1994), with Daniel M.
Hausman, Why Look Under the Hood?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS, supra, at 217.
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— as though a political scientist decided to study only the behavior of
left-handed senators, deferring right-handed ones to future research.
In particular, it is unsatisfying to model legislators as entering a “policy
lottery” by enacting ambiguous delegating statutes, but then also to
picture them as clearly specifying the identity of the delegate. The
same institutional and political factors that tend to produce a firstorder policy lottery over statutory substance also tend to produce a
second-order “delegation lottery” over the question whether agencies or
courts have ultimate interpretive authority.
With respect to predictions, the model implies comparative statics
that yield various hypotheses, but it seems unlikely that these hypotheses, even if testable, are significant in a political sense. The factors the
model includes are, at best, second-decimal considerations relative to
the factors it excludes. Indeed, if the included factors really are second-decimal considerations for rational legislators, the model may not
be testable in any event: the included factors might not be sufficiently
weighty to leave statistically significant traces that are discernable
through the fog of political behavior.
I. THE DELEGATION LOTTERY
The most crucial of the model’s assumptions is a sharp distinction
between the questions “delegation of what?” and “delegation to
whom?” The rational legislator is pictured as voting on a statute with
ambiguous first-order provisions and yet as also making a definite second-order choice about whether courts or agencies will have the authority to interpret those provisions.4 The motivation for this partial
simplification is clear. On the one hand, absent first-order ambiguity
there would be no interpretive questions in the picture. On the other
hand, introducing second-order ambiguity about the identity of the
delegate would make the problem substantially less tractable. Yet the
resulting simplification is excessively artificial. It does not resonate
with the realities of the administrative state, at least in modern times;
it carves the subject against the grain.
A danger signal here is the article’s relentless abstraction. Stephenson is interested in generating models rather than empirical testing,
but the article contains no real set of examples to motivate the model’s
assumptions. The debates over the Interstate Commerce Commission
from the late nineteenth century are mentioned, as are a handful of
statutes that explicitly assign interpretive responsibility to courts
rather than agencies.5 Yet in the modern administrative state, many
statutes are silent or ambiguous not only about various first-order legal
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
4
5

See Stephenson, supra note 1, at 1049–51.
See id. at 1039 & n.11.
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and regulatory questions, but also about the identity of the delegate
who is given interpretive authority. The model’s partial simplification
invokes the standard political science metaphor that legislators enacting statutes with ambiguous first-order provisions enter a policy lottery. Yet if there is a first-order policy lottery about how statutes will
be interpreted, there is also a second-order “delegation lottery” about
who will ultimately do the interpreting.
This second-order uncertainty6 should not be surprising; all of the
institutional causes of first-order ambiguity can also cause secondorder ambiguity. Failures of legislative foresight or simply poor drafting may cause not only unintended first-order ambiguities, but also
second-order ambiguities. The inability of political coalitions to agree
may produce legislation that is vague or ambiguous about substance,
yet it may also produce legislation that is vague about the identity of
the delegate. Both sides of a contested policy question may prove willing to take their chances at the second level as well as the first.
Most fundamentally, the second-order delegation lottery arises from
pervasive uncertainty in administrative law about the default rules for
allocating interpretive authority. At least for statutes enacted after
1946, it might be tempting to say that the global second-order default
rule is delegation to the judiciary, pointing to the Administrative Procedure Act’s provision that courts shall decide all relevant questions of
law.7 Yet for decades after the Act’s passage, courts issued conflicting
decisions about deference to administrative agencies and discussed a
variety of relevant factors without a clear theoretical framework, thus
creating substantial uncertainty about who the ultimate recipient of interpretive authority would be when statutes were silent or ambiguous.8
In the period after 1984, the Chevron decision9 established something
like a global default rule for second-order allocation of interpretive authority: if statutes were “clear,” courts would announce their meaning;
if not, interpretations by the administering agencies would prevail so
long as they were “reasonable.” Yet even this default rule contained a
great deal of lurking legal uncertainty because what is “clear” and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
6 Following Stephenson, I use “uncertainty” in its colloquial sense, not in its technical sense of
uncertainty as opposed to risk. On this distinction, see DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA,
GAMES AND DECISIONS 277–78 (1957). Stephenson’s title suggests a distinction between uncertainty and risk, but the body of the article does not pursue the issue.
7 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§§ 706 (2000).
8 For a summary of the conflicting approaches and the uncertainty they created, see Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 725 F.2d 761, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1984). I bracket here the
provocative claim that, for some time after 1946, there was a well-understood historical convention, since vanished from view, that a grant of rulemaking authority to an agency carried with it
law-interpreting authority. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with
the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002).
9 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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what is “reasonable” is hardly self-evident, because Chevron deference
only applied to agency interpretations that were sufficiently “authoritative,”10 and because with respect to some ill-defined category of questions — for example, whether statutes create private causes of action
— courts might say that the administering agency for Chevron purposes just is the judiciary itself.11
The uncertainties surrounding the delegation lottery have only increased in recent years, since the all-important Mead decision.12 Since
Mead, a large and growing body of law and theory — “Chevron Step
Zero”13 — addresses the question whether Congress will be taken to
have delegated ultimate law-interpreting authority to agencies or
courts. The law of Chevron Step Zero is notably uncertain, in part because the Court majority that produced Mead refuses to bind itself to
anything like categorical rules or conventions; the resulting doctrinal
mess has produced serious confusion in the lower courts.14 Justice
Breyer, who has some claim to being Mead’s intellectual mastermind
(although not the decision’s actual author),15 recently opined that even
notice-and-comment rulemaking, the staple diet of the administrative
state, is neither necessary nor sufficient for Chevron deference.16 If
this view prevails, it would produce a multifactor quicksand that
courts and parties will have to traverse even to approach the Chevron
inquiry — in turn creating pressure to avoid the whole Step Zero inquiry by claiming that statutes are “clear” in one direction or another,
even if they really are not.
Perhaps the model might be modified and extended to account for
the delegation lottery. Perhaps, without too great an increase in
mathematical complexity, the model might incorporate the idea that
the identity of the delegate is probabilistic, with legislators facing a
cost to increase the probability of ending up with a delegate matching
their preferences. Another tradeoff inherent in modeling would then
have increased bite, however: the more dimensions in which relevant
actors may maneuver and the more types of transaction cost that are
relevant to their behavior, the less likely it is that the model will yield
specific and testable predictions — especially if the behavioral factors
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
10
11
12
13

See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990).
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836
(2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=739129.
14 See Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347
(2003).
15 See Sunstein, supra note 13 (manuscript at 18).
16 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2712–13
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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one is attempting to predict are of small importance relative to other
determinants of behavior. I return to these points shortly. All I mean
to indicate here is that there is a tradeoff across the problems of (1)
omitted considerations, (2) mathematical tractability, and (3) predictive
determinacy. The constraint on revising the model to sidestep problem
(1) is that one or both of problems (2) and (3) is bound to become more
serious.
Stephenson concludes that “[l]egislators who delegate interpretive
power must pick the agent to whom they will delegate, thereby choosing which policy lottery they will enter.”17 The “must” here seems ungrounded: legislators are never forced to specify a delegate, and much
of the time they do not do so, at least not explicitly. To be sure, the
delegation lottery is sometimes avoided; criminal statutes are generally
interpreted by the courts,18 and sometimes civil statutes are explicit
about the choice of delegate, either by virtue of their text or by virtue
of clear interpretive conventions in the background. The point is not
that legislators always enter a delegation lottery, but that they often
do. For a generation, at least, second-order uncertainty about statutes
that do not speak explicitly to the identity of the delegate has been
among the central issues of administrative law. A model that puts the
issue aside, whether for future research or not, is bound to seem and
be artificial, even accounting for the necessary simplifications of positive political theory.
II. SECOND-DECIMAL CONSIDERATIONS AND
TESTABLE PREDICTIONS
Stephenson says, quite rightly, that the literature on delegation emphasizes three types of explanation — expertise, principal-agent relations, and the manipulation of political credit or blame — and that his
model will add or expand upon19 a fourth factor: the relative variance
associated with agency decisions and court decisions, both across issues
and over time. In this picture, rational legislators have an interest in
consistency — in the reduction of variance — for its own sake, over
and above their interest in the substance of the relevant rules. Stephenson points out that consistency can be defined either across issues
or over time and that there is a tradeoff between the two. Stephenson
then suggests (and I will assume for discussion’s sake) that agencies
are better at producing interissue consistency, while courts are better at
producing intertemporal consistency. To the extent that the preference
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
17
18
19

Stephenson, supra note 1, at 1070.
See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990).
Stephenson builds upon models pioneered by Morris Fiorina. See Stephenson, supra note 1,
at 1045–47.
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for interissue consistency predominates, legislators will favor delegation to agencies; to the extent that consistency over time is more important, they will favor delegation to courts. Putting aside additional
complexities, this is the nub of the model.
So the interest in variance reduction has marginal importance only
to the extent rational legislators care about more than the expected
value of the choice of delegate. It exists, in other words, only once we
have already bracketed and put aside the other considerations bearing
upon the choice of delegate that Stephenson mentions — which delegate is more likely to get policies right (the expertise interest), which
delegate is more likely to give legislators the policies they want regardless of what is right (the interest in minimizing agency slack), and
which delegation is more likely to generate political credit for legislators. Let us stipulate that some variance-reduction interest exists, over
and above these factors. The crucial issue — one that the model cannot tell us anything about — is the importance of this interest. The
danger is that we are dealing here with a second-decimal consideration, one whose importance is swamped by the more familiar factors
the model leaves aside.
The principal-agent model of the choice of delegate, for example,
resonates with what we observe of the administrative state independently and pre-theoretically. It is obvious in many cases that legislators
care very much about ensuring a delegate who will produce policies
that suit their interests, in the expected-value sense, without particular
regard to consistency either across issues or over time. Perhaps in
other cases the variance-reduction model gains traction, but it seems
plausible that the obvious considerations bracketed by the model are
also the most important considerations. The factors emphasized in
Stephenson’s model are not obvious, but by the same token they are
not obviously important. Counterintuitive models often lie about waiting to be discovered just because the most intuitive considerations are,
quite often, also the dominant considerations.
Put another way, the model’s engine is an explicit assumption that
legislators are risk averse.20 This is quite possible, and doubtless
sometimes true; but how often is it true? Here again the lack of concrete motivating examples makes it hard to come to grips with the issue. At one point Stephenson suggests that legislative risk aversion is
a product of tight principal-agent control of legislators by corporate or
economic interest groups, who themselves desire to reduce variance.21
Yet the standard assumption in economic modeling is that corporations
are risk neutral, because shareholders can diversify risk at lower cost
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
20
21

Id. at 1052.
Or so I read the discussion of “consistency interests.” See id. at 1058–59.
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than corporate managers. Moreover, it is puzzling that legislators who
are assumed to be risk averse are also assumed, by another crucial
premise of the model, to be willing to enter a policy lottery in the first
place; those who enter lotteries are usually risk-preferring.
To be sure, the best way to determine whether variance reduction
is a major or minor consideration is to test the model rather than reason a priori or discuss case studies. Yet the real possibility that variance reduction is a second-decimal consideration also undermines the
model’s ability to generate testable predictions. Here we must disentangle two points. Statistical significance is not the same as political or
economic significance. So one point is that the variance-reduction interest might be detected by statistically significant tests, yet turn out
not to matter very much. It is also possible, however, that the very
lack of political significance will make it hard to detect any variancereduction interest through the surrounding noise of legislative behavior, just as a very small organism is undetectable with a crude microscope. Stephenson is admirably candid about this. He calls his hypotheses testable “in principle,”22 but of course nearly all nonanalytic
propositions are testable in principle. The hard part is testing in practice, and it is not clear at all that this model yields practically testable
predictions.
CONCLUSION
The variance-reduction model of legislative delegation is ingenious.
It is not clear, however, what it is a model of. Not of the modern administrative state, in which the second-order delegation lottery over
the identity of the interpreter is as important as the first-order policy
lottery over the interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions. Not,
or probably not, of legislators who are portrayed as beholden to riskneutral interest groups and who plausibly care most of all about the
standard considerations of expertise, slack minimization, and political
credit that Stephenson puts aside. Overall, one senses here that the
model is dictating the choice of problems, rather than the problem
suggesting the choice among models.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
22

Id. at 1062.
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